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We propose a complete framework for the assessment of climate change mitigation
policies in an endogenous growth model with two dedicated R&D sectors. First, we
characterize the optimum analytically. Second, we derive the equilibrium paths in
a decentralized economy. Since knowledge is not embodied into intermediate goods,
its price is defined in an alternative way (as a part of its social value, which is equal
to the sum of its marginal profitabilities in all sectors using it). Moreover, the two
types of market failures arising in our setting, i.e. the pollution from fossil resource
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carbon tax and a research subsidy for each R&D sector. Third, we determine the
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each corresponding equilibrium from the "laisser-faire" benchmark.
JEL classification: H23, O32, Q43, Q54, Q55.
Keywords: Exhaustible resource, backstop, energy, endogenous R&D, climate
change, economic policies.
∗We are very grateful to David Popp for having provided us with the code and the detailed docu-
mentation of ENTICE-BR. We acknowledge financial support from CFE (World Energy Council, French
committee).
†Corresponding author. LERNA, 21 allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse  France. E-mail address:
glafforg@toulouse.inra.fr. E-mail addresses of other authors: grimaud@cict.fr and bertrand.magne@psi.ch
1
1 Introduction
Emerging energy technologies, such as clean coal or renewable energy, are crucial for a
cost-effective climate change mitigation policy. The relevant appraisal of a climate policy
should thus include the appropriate incentives for R&D investments in carbon-free ener-
gies that will drive the substantial technical improvements necessary to their large scale
deployment1 (see Energy Journal, 2006, Special issue on endogenous technical change and
the economics of atmospheric stabilization). In this methodological paper, we propose a
complete framework for the assessment of climate change mitigation policies in an endoge-
nous growth model with two dedicated R&D sectors. Moreover, we put emphasis on the
design of the innovation markets and their pricing, underlying clean energy investments.
The strand of literature on economic growth and climate change mostly contains op-
timization models (see for instance Bosetti et al., 2006; Edenhofer et al., 2005 and 2006;
Gerlagh 2006; Gerlagh and Van Der Zwaan 2006; Popp, 2004, 2006a and 2006b). In
those models, only the optimum is generally characterized, together with the system of
prices that implements this optimum and, eventually, the optimal environmental policy
instruments (e.g. a carbon tax defined as the co-state variable associated with the stock
of cumulative atmospheric pollution, namely CO2 and other greenhouse gases, or as the
marginal cost of an abatement process, if available). Nonetheless, the models mentioned
above generally do not study the equilibrium in a decentralized economy2. They also lack
some insights as for the channels of financing the innovations in the energy sector and the
discrepancy between the private investment decision and the socially desirable amounts
(Köhler et al., 2006).
The study of the decentralized economy offers one major advantage: it allows for the
entire characterization of the continuum of all existing equilibria and not only the optimal
one. Indeed, a particular equilibrium is associated with each feasible vector of policy
instruments. The approach followed in this paper gives some insights on how the economy
reacts to policy changes: when the economy faces one or several market failures, e.g.
pollution, market power or research spillovers, this characterization of market equilibria
reveals crucial for measuring the impacts of economic tools such as environmental taxes,
1In 2004, wind and solar energy represented roughly 0.4% of world energy supply (IEA, 2006).
2For instance, as Edenhofer et al. (2006) put it about their MIND model: "Therefore, designing a
general intertemporal equilibrium version of MIND for a comparison with the social planner solution would
be the natural next step". An exception is Laurent-Lucchetti and Leach (2006) that derive numerically
the decentralized outcome of their model.
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pollution permits or research subsidies. Because of budgetary, socioeconomic or political
constraints, the enforcement of first best optimum is usually difficult to achieve for the
policy-maker that would rather implement second-best solutions.
The objective of this paper is to complete the literature mentioned above by setting
up a global analysis, i.e. a general equilibrium analysis, that includes explicitly both the
optimal outcome and the decentralized equilibrium. We develop an endogenous growth
model in which energy services can be produced from a polluting non-renewable resource
as well as a clean backstop. As in Popp (2006a), we introduce two R&D sectors, the
first one improving the efficiency of energy production and the second one, the efficiency
of the backstop. With this respect, we have to consider two types of market failures:
the pollution from fossil resource consumption and the research spillovers of each R&D
sector. That is why, in the decentralized equilibrium, we introduce two kinds of economic
policy instruments in accordance: a tax on the fossil fuel use3 and a research subsidy
for the energy and backstop R&D sectors. There is an equilibrium associated to each
vector of instruments, which allows to study the impact of one or several policy changes
on the equilibrium trajectories. Clearly, when public instruments are optimally set, the
equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincides with the first best optimum.
However, the main difficulty of this exercise lies in the introduction and the charac-
terization of a specific market for knowledge, together with its associated prices. The
standard endogenous growth theory advocates the introduction of an intermediate mar-
ket for each kind of innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Romer, 1990; Grossman and
Helpman, 1991). But embodying knowledge into intermediate goods becomes inextricable
in more general computable endogenous growth models with pollution and/or natural re-
sources such as the ones previously mentioned. In addition, those technical difficulties are
emphasized when dealing with several research sectors, i.e. when there are several types
of specific knowledge, each of them being dedicated to a particular input (resource, labor,
capital, backstop...) as it is proposed in Acemoglu (2002). It follows that research activity
is not expected to be funded by profits of monopolies on these goods. We suppose in fact
that it is directly financed by the innovation users, eventually completed by public funds.
We thus propose a method, based on Grimaud and Rougé (2005)4, that consists in three
3Fischer et al. (2003) and Nordhaus (2005) analyze the relative advantage of such a carbon tax as
compared to a tradable emission permit system. In an earlier paper, Pizer (2002) argues that, when
uncertainties about climate change mitigation costs are accounted for, price controls are much more efficient
as long as damages are not too abrupt.
4See also Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007).
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points. First, we define the optimal price of one unit of specific knowledge (associated with
the energy or backstop R&D sectors) as the sum of the marginal profitabilities of this unit in
each sector using this specific knowledge. Second, by referring to several empirical studies
(see for instance Jones, 1995; Jones and Williams, 1998; Popp, 2004, 2006a), we assume
that, in the decentralized economy, the equilibrium price of knowledge is in fact equal
to a given proportion of this optimal value, usually on the order of a quarter to a third.
Hence, the market value is lower than the social one because of observability, information
and excludability problems. Third, we assume that the R&D sectors can be subsidized
in order to reduce the gap between these social and private values, the maximum subsidy
percentage ranging from two thirds to three quarters according to the assumed level of the
equilibrium price.
Solving such an endogenous growth model both in a centralized and in a decentralized
economy provides three main streams of results. First, the fact that the optimal policy
instruments, which have been computed analytically, implement numerically the optimal
trajectories confirms the consistency of the equilibrium concept used here, in particular
regarding the characterization of the knowledge market and the computation of the inno-
vation social values for each R&D sector. Second, comparing numerically the optimum and
the equilibrium situation of "laisser-faire" allows us to measure the impact of the optimal
instruments on the vector of prices and quantities of all economic sectors. In addition,
since the analysis is undertaken at a decentralized level, we are able to dissociate those
effects according to the various sectors: energy, backstop, fossil fuel, R&D. Third, our
methodology renders possible the impact study of any economic policy on all variables,
prices and quantities. In particular, we isolate the effects of the environmental policy from
the ones of the research policies and vice versa. For instance, we show that an increase
in the carbon tax has no effect on the R&D activities. It reduces the flow of fossil fuel
extraction and stimulates the backstop penetration. It also implies a rent transfer from
the resource-holders to the government. Moreover, jointed research policy in each R&D
sector increases the knowledge accumulation in both sectors. Simultaneously, such a pol-
icy reduces the fossil fuel extraction and increases the backstop use. However, a research
policy in a given R&D sector has no effect on the level of knowledge in the other R&D
sector.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. In section
3, we determine the optimal solutions owing to five characterizing conditions. Section 4
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studies the decentralized economy. We first analyze the behavior of each agent in the
economy. Next, we characterize the equilibrium solutions owing to five conditions and we
compute the equilibrium prices for any policy levels. We also show in a short method-
ological note how to solve the decentralized equilibrium as a single maximization problem,
which is necessary to solve the model numerically. In section 5, we implement the first
best optimum by comparing the two corresponding sets of characterizing conditions, which
allows us to determine the optimal policies. In section 6, we derive a selection of numeric
results focusing on i) the simultaneous effects of all the optimal policies (i.e. comparison
between the optimum and the "laisser-faire" equilibrium), and ii) the differentiated effects
of one policy, the other ones being given5. We conclude in section 7.
2 The model
We consider an economy in which, at each time t, a quantity Qt of a homogeneous good is
produced according to the following technology:
Qt = Q(Kt, Et, Lt, At), (1)
where Kt is the amount of physical capital used within the production process, Et is the
flow of energy services, Lt, Lt ≡ L0e
∫ t
0 gL,sds, denotes labor and At, At ≡ A0e
∫ t
0 gA,sds, is
an efficiency index that measures the total productivity of factors. Growth rates gL,t and
gA,t are exogenously given. Since, as we will see later, climate change affects global income
and not utility, Qt is in fact the final output that we would get without any environmental
damage. Function Q(.) is assumed to be increasing and concave in each of his arguments
and exhibits constant return to scale.
As in Popp (2006a), production of energy services requires some specific knowledge
HE,t, fossil fuels Ft and a backstop energy source Bt:
Et = E(HE,t, Ft, Bt). (2)
Production function E(.) is increasing and concave in each argument and the backstop
and the fossil fuel are supposed to be imperfect substitutes. HE,t represents technologi-
cal improvements into overall energy production process, in the form of energy efficiency
improvements.
5The functional specifications used for numerical computations are provided in the appendix.
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The fossil fuel end product is obtained from some carbon-based non-renewable resource
and some specific investment6:
Ft = F (QF,t, Zt), (3)
where QF,t is the amount of final product devoted to the production of fossil fuel and Zt,
Zt ≡
∫ t
0 Fsds, is the cumulative extraction of the exhaustible resource from the initial date
up to t. We assume that function F (.) is increasing and concave in QF , decreasing and
convex in Z, and that the fossil fuel extraction is constrained by a ceiling Z¯: Zt ≤ Z¯,
∀t ≥ 0.7
The backstop resource is produced from specific investment and knowledge8:
Bt = B(QB,t, HB,t), (4)
where B(.) is an increasing and concave function in QB,t, the amount of final product
that is devoted to the backstop production sector, and in HB,t, the stock of knowledge
pertaining to the backstop.
In this model, there are two stocks of knowledge, HE and HB, each associated with a
specific R&D sector (i.e. the energy and the backstop ones). We now specify the dynamics
of these two stocks. In the energy (resp. the backstop) R&D sector, we consider that
each innovation is a public, indivisible and infinitely durable good which is simultaneously
used by the energy (resp. backstop) production sector and by the R&D sector in question.
Formally, it is a point on the segment [0, HE,t] (resp. [0, HB,t]). At each time t, the stock
of knowledge in sector i, i = {B,E}, evolves as follows:
H˙i,t = H i(Ri,t, Hi,t), (5)
where Ri,t is the R&D investment into sector i, i.e. the amount of final output that is
devoted to R&D sector i, and H i(.) an innovation function assumed to be increasing and
6An appreciable difference with the DICE stream of models lies in the definition of such a production
function which, in fact, replaces the cost (or price) function of the fossil fuel. In Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000) or in Popp (2004, 2006a), such a full cost function is equal to the full extraction cost augmented
by the scarcity rent that depends on Zt. By making this transformation, this utility/technology canonical
model allows for an endogenous determination of the resource market price when solving the equilibrium
(see section 4 below). However, we will analytically specify function F (.) in such a way that there exists a
correspondence with the cost function mentioned below and such that the calibration of the DICE model
still applies.
7Here, the capacity constraint of the exhaustible resource is not characterized by the limited availability
of initial stocks, but by the decreasing relationship between the flow of produced fossil fuel and the amount
of resource that has already been extracted. Then, resource scarcity is not physically but economically
captured.
8The same remark as the one formulated for the fossil fuel production function applies, i.e. the backstop
price as defined in the ENTICE-BR model is here replaced by a production function.
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concave in each argument. Then, the stock of knowledge Hi,t increases due to increases in
R&D effort and in already accumulated knowledge, but there are diminishing returns to
research over time.
Pollution is generated by fossil fuel use. Let α be the unitary carbon content of fossil
fuel such that, without any abatement policy, the carbon flow released into the atmosphere
would be equal to αFt. Let G0 be the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at the beginning
of the planning period, Gt the stock at time t and ζ, ζ > 0, the natural rate of decay, so
that9:
G˙t = αFt − ζGt. (6)
As in the DICE model (see also Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996), the atmospheric carbon
concentration does not directly enter the damage function. In fact, the increase in car-
bon concentration drives the global mean temperature away from a given state  here the
1990 level  and the difference between this state and the present global mean tempera-
ture should be taken as an index of climate change. Let Tt denote this difference, whose
dynamics is governed by the following state equation:
T˙t = Φ(Gt)−mTt, (7)
where Φ(.) is an increasing and concave function that links the atmospheric carbon con-
centration to the dynamics of temperature (i.e. the radiative forcing as characterized in
Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) and m, m > 0, is a constant parameter10.
We denote by D(Tt) the instantaneous unitary damage. This damage affects society
through the global income Yt. Then, the final output when taking into account climate
change effects is:
Yt = D(Tt)×Qt, (8)
9In the analytical treatment of the model, we assume for the sake of clarity that the emission and
natural decay rates are constant, despite what the DICE model recommends. However, in the numerical
simulations, we adopt the carbon cycle characterization from DICE, that represents the carbon enhances
between the oceans and the atmosphere. Based on Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Goulder and Mathai (2000)
estimate parameters α and ζ that take into account the inertia of the climatic system. They state that
only 64% of current emissions actually contribute to the augmentation of atmospheric CO2 and that the
portion of current CO2 concentration in excess is removed naturally at a rate of 0.8% per year.
10As for the dynamics of the atmospheric carbon stock, the state equation (7) replaces in fact a more
complex and general set of dynamic equations which considers two measures of temperature  the atmo-
spheric temperature and the lower oceanic one  and the interactions between both. Kriegler and Bruckner
(2004) have recourse to such simplified dynamics by using a log function for Φ and by estimating the associ-
ated parameter m. However, for numerical simulations, we keep the DICE formulation that fully describes
temperature variations.
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where D(.) is a strictly concave inverted U-shaped function: as the global mean temper-
ature increases, the unitary environmental damage first grows until it reaches a peak and
next, it diminishes.
The final output is devoted to either aggregated consumption Ct, fossil fuel production
QF,t, backstop production QB,t, investment in physical capital It or in the two R&D sectors
RE,t and RB,t:
Yt = Ct +QF,t +QB,t + It +RE,t +RB,t. (9)
The dynamic equation of the physical capital stock is:
K˙t = It − δKt, (10)
where δ, δ > 0, is the capital depreciation rate.
Finally, the social welfare function Wt is defined as:
Wt =
∫ t
0
U(Cs)e−
∫ s
0 ρτdτds =
∫ t
0
Lsu(cs)e−
∫ s
0 ρτdτds, (11)
where ρt, ρt ≡ ρ0e−gρt, is the instantaneous social rate of time preferences, gρ is the
constant declining rate of ρt, U(Ct) is the instantaneous utility function from aggregated
consumption, ct ≡ Ct/Lt is the per capita consumption and u(ct) is the per capita in-
stantaneous utility function. As usual, functions U(.) and u(.) are increasing, concave and
satisfy Inada conditions. The model is summarized in Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
To conduct numerical simulations, we assign functional specifications to the utility and
technological functions so as to obtain a calibrated model. Those functional forms are
listed in Appendix A1.
3 Welfare analysis
The social planner problem consists in choosing {Ct, QF,t, QB,t, RE,t, RB,t}∞t=0 that max-
imizes W∞, as defined by (11), subject to constraints (1)-(10). After eliminating the
co-state variables, the first order conditions reduce to the five characteristic conditions of
Proposition 1 below, which hold at each time t.
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Proposition 1 At each time t, an optimum is characterized by the following five condi-
tions: [
D(Tt)QEEF − 1
FQF
]
U ′(Ct)e−
∫ t
0 ρsds +
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
U ′(Cs)e−
∫ s
0 ρxdxds
+α
∫ ∞
t
[∫ ∞
s
D′(Tx)QxU ′(Cx)e−[m(x−s)+
∫ x
0 ρydy]dx
]
Φ′(Gs)e−ζ(s−t)ds = 0 (12)
D(Tt)QEEBBQB = 1 (13)
D(Tt)QK − δ = Ψt (14)
HBHB +
HBRBBHB
BQB
− H˙
B
RB
HBRB
= Ψt (15)
HEHE +
HEREEHE
EBBQB
− H˙
E
RE
HERE
= Ψt (16)
where JX stands for the partial derivative of function J(.) with respect to X and Ψt ≡
ρt − U˙ ′(Ct)/U ′(Ct).
Proof. See Appendix A2.
Equation (12) reads as a particular version of the Hotelling rule in this model, which
takes into account the carbon accumulation in the atmosphere, the dynamics of tempera-
tures and their effects on output. We will see later (cf. equation (35) in Proposition 2) that
this equation allows for the computation of the optimal tax on the fossil fuel. Equation
(13) tells that the marginal productivity of specific input QB,t equals its marginal cost.
The three last equations are Keynes-Ramsey conditions. Equation (14) characterizes the
optimal trade-off between physical capital Kt and consumption Ct, as in more standard
growth models. Equation (15) (resp. (16)) characterizes the same kind of optimal trade-off
between specific investment into backstop R&D sector, RB,t (resp. energy R&D sector,
RE,t) and consumption.
4 Decentralized equilibrium
4.1 Behavior of agents
In the decentralized economy, we assume that all sectors are perfectly competitive. The
price of output Yt is normalized to one and pF,t, pB,t, pE,t, wt and rt are, respectively, the
prices at date t of fossil fuel, backstop, energy, labor (real wage) and the interest rate on
financial market.
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Recall that production of fossil fuels generates some carbon emission flow. The accumu-
lation of carbon in the atmosphere drives the global mean temperature to increase and, in
that way, it induces an environmental damage. This environmental externality should cre-
ate a market failure without any corrective policy since the fossil fuel user, i.e. the energy
producer, does not take into account its negative impact on social welfare. That is why we
introduce an environmental policy defined as a tax τt on the fossil fuel consumption.
We have seen above that both R&D sectors produce innovations which are public,
indivisible and infinitely durable pieces of knowledge. A basic feature of the present model
is that these innovations are not embodied into private intermediate goods, as it is done
for instance in the standard models of endogenous growth. Thus, we cannot assume that
the research activity is funded by profits of monopolies on these goods. Here, we suppose
that research is directly financed. First, in each research sector, we determine the social
value of an innovation. Since an innovation is a public good, this social value is the sum
of marginal profitabilities of this innovation in all sectors which use it. If this value is paid
to the inventor, the first best optimum is implemented11. But we know that, in the real
world, only a part of this sum is generally extracted (for instance, Jones and Williams,
1998, estimate that actual investment in research are at least four times below what would
be socially optimal; on this point, see also Popp, 2006a). Thus, in a second step, we
define the market value as a percentage of the social value. Basically, the market value
is lower than the social one because the innovator faces observability, information and
excludability problems. However, we can assume that the research sectors are subsidized
in order to reduce the gap between the social and the private values of innovations.
To sum up, there are two types of policy tools in the model: an environmental tax on
the resource and two subsidies for the backstop and energy research sectors.
4.1.1 The fossil resource sector
The program of the fossil fuel producer writes:
max
{QF ,t≥0}
∫ ∞
0
(
psF,tFt −QF,t
)
e−
∫ t
0 rsdsdt s.t. (3) and Zt =
∫ t
0
Fsds,
11This result will be proved by Proposition 3 below. In fact, what we call social value is the sum of the
Lindahl prices associated with the innovations.
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where psF,t denotes the selling price of the fossil resource, i.e. the price which is received
by the resource-holder. Static and dynamic first order conditions are:
(psF,tFQF − 1)e−
∫ t
0 rsds + ηtFQF = 0 (17)
psF,tFZe
− ∫ t0 rsds + ηtFZ = −η˙t, (18)
together with the transversality condition limt→∞ ηtZt = 0. Replacing pF into (18) by its
expression coming from (17), it comes:
η˙t = − FZ
FQF
e−
∫ t
0 rsds. (19)
By integrating (19) and using (17) again, we find:
ηt =
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
0 rududs and psF,t =
1
FQF
−
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
t rduds. (20)
4.1.2 The backstop sector
At each time t, the backstop producer maximizes its profit ΠBt = [pB,tBt −QB,t], subject
to technological constraint (4). The first order condition determines, for each time t, the
inverse demand function for specific investment QB,t:
pB,t =
1
BQB
. (21)
4.1.3 The energy sector
At each time t, the energy producer maximizes ΠEt =
[
pE,tEt − pmF,tFt − pB,tBt
]
subject
to (2), where pmF,t is the fossil fuel market price, i.e. the price which is paid by the firm
and which includes the environmental tax τt. This tariff is assumed to be additive: p
m
F,t =
psF,t + τt. However, our results can easily be extended to the case of an ad-valorem tax τ
a
t :
pmF,t = p
s
F,t(1 + τ
a
t ). The first order conditions write:
∂ΠEt
∂Ft
= 0 ⇒ pE,t =
pmF,t
EF
=
psF,t + τt
EF
(22)
∂ΠEt
∂Bt
= 0 ⇒ pE,t = pB,t
EB
. (23)
Those conditions determine respectively the inverse demand functions for fossil fuel and
backstop.
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4.1.4 The R&D sectors
The behaviors of the backstop and energy R&D sectors are analogous so that we will study
a single problem indexing by i, i = {B,E}, the sector in question. As we have mentioned
above, knowledge is not embodied into intermediate goods, which implies that it can not
be financed by the sale of these goods. As in Grimaud and Rougé (2005), we suppose that
it is in fact directly financed by public funds, the government paying to the innovator an
amount which is equal to a part of the willingness to pay of both sectors using this type of
knowledge, i.e. the R&D sector i and the energy or the backstop sectors. In other words,
the government subsidizes the sectors which buy knowledge12.
Let us consider for instance the energy R&D sector. Each innovation produced by this
sector is used by the sector itself as well as by the energy sector. Thus, at each date t,
the instantaneous social value of this innovation is v¯HE ,t = v
E
HE ,t
+ vHEHE ,t, where v
E
HE ,t
and
vHEHE ,t are the marginal profitabilities of this innovation in the energy production sector
and in the energy R&D sector, respectively. The social value of this innovation at t is
V¯HE ,t =
∫∞
t v¯HE ,se
− ∫ st rxdxds. Assume that only a part γE,t, with 0 < γE,t ≤ 1, ∀t ≥ 0, is
paid to the innovator. Then, the instantaneous market value is:
vHE ,t = γE,tv¯E,t = γE,t
(
vEHE ,t + v
HE
HE ,t
)
, (24)
and the market value at date t is:
VHE ,t =
∫ ∞
t
vHE ,se
− ∫ st rxdxds. (25)
Similarly, the instantaneous social value of an innovation in the backstop R&D sector
is v¯HB ,t = v
B
HB ,t
+ vHBHB ,t, where v
B
HB ,t
and vHBHB ,t are the marginal profitabilities of an
innovation in the backstop sector and in the backstop R&D sector, respectively. Then,
V¯HB ,t =
∫∞
t v¯HB ,se
− ∫ st rxdxds is the social value of an innovation at date t, and VHB ,t =∫∞
t vHB ,se
− ∫ st rxdxds is the market value, in which vHB ,t = γB,tv¯HB ,t, with 0 < γB,t ≤ 1,
∀t ≥ 0. Note that differentiating (25) (and the corresponding equation for VHB ,t) with
respect to time leads to the usual arbitrage relation:
rt =
V˙Hi,t
VHi,t
+
vHi,t
VHi,t
, ∀i = {B,E} , (26)
which reads as the equality between the rate of return on the financial market (left hand
side) and the rate of return on the R&D sector i (right hand side).
12This assumption is in fact a simplification of a more general framework in which firms using knowledge
as input sell their goods on imperfect competitive (e.g. Cournot) markets that allow them to get strictly
positive profits to buy knowledge (see Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2007).
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At each time t, the R&D sector i, i = {B,E}, supplies the flow of innovations H˙i,t at
price VHi,t and demands some specific investment Ri,t at price 1, so that the profit function
to be maximized is ΠHit =
[
VHi,tH
i(Ri,t, Hi,t)−Ri,t
]
. The first order condition implies:
∂ΠHit
∂Ri,t
= 0 ⇒ VHi,t =
1
H iRi
. (27)
The marginal profitability for specific knowledge of R&D sector i is:
vHiHi,t =
∂ΠHit
∂Hi,t
= VHi,tH
i
Hi =
H iHi
H iRi
, ∀i = {B,E} . (28)
In order to determine the value of an innovation in both research sectors, we need to know
the marginal profitabilities of innovations in the energy and backstop production sectors.
From (21) and (23), those values are given by:
vEHE ,t =
∂ΠEt
∂HE,t
=
EHE
EBBQB
, (29)
vBHB ,t =
∂ΠBt
∂HB,t
=
BHB
BQB
. (30)
4.1.5 The final good sector
At each time t, the firm chooses {Kt, Et, Lt}∞t=0 that maximizes its profit function ΠQt =
[D(Tt)Qt − PE,tEt − wtLt − (rt + δ)Kt], subject to (1). The first order conditions are:
∂ΠQt
∂Kt
= 0 ⇒ rt = D(Tt)QK − δ (31)
∂ΠQt
∂Et
= 0 ⇒ pE,t = D(Tt)QE (32)
∂ΠQt
∂Lt
= 0 ⇒ wt = D(Tt)QL. (33)
4.1.6 The household
The representative household maximizes W∞ subject to the following dynamic budget
constraint: M˙t = rMt +wtLt + Πt−Ct−T at , where Mt is the stock of bonds at time t, Πt
is the total profits gained in the economy (including the resource rent) and T at is a lump-
sum tax (subsidy free) that allows to balance the budget constraint of the government.
This maximization leads to the following condition:
ρt − U˙
′(C)
U ′(C)
= rt ⇒ U ′(Ct) = U ′(C0)e
∫ t
0 (ρs−rs)ds. (34)
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4.1.7 The government
Assuming that the government's budget constraint holds at each time t, then it writes:
T at + τtFt = VHB ,tH˙B,t + VHE ,tH˙E,t,
where VHi,t depends on the subsidy level γi, i = {B,E} (see (24) and (25) above).
4.2 Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
From the previous analysis of individual behaviors, we can now characterize an equilibrium
in the decentralized economy, which is done by the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 For a given triplet of policies {γB,t, γE,t, τt}∞t=0, the equilibrium conditions
can be summed up as follows:[
D(Tt)QEEF − τt − 1
FQF
]
e−
∫ t
0 rsds +
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
0 rxdxds = 0 (35)
D(Tt)QEEBBQB = 1 (36)
D(Tt)QK − δ = ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(37)
−H˙
B
RB
HBRB
+ γB,t
[
BHBH
B
RB
BQB
+HBHB
]
= ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(38)
−H˙
E
RE
HERE
+ γE,t
[
EHEH
E
RE
EBBQB
+HEHE
]
= ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(39)
and the equilibrium corresponding prices are:
r∗t = D(Tt)QK − δ (40)
w∗t = D(Tt)QL (41)
ps∗F,t =
1
FQF
−
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
t rxdxds (42)
p∗B,t =
1
BQB
(43)
p∗E,t =
ps∗F,t + τt
EF
=
p∗B,t
EB
= D(Tt)QE (44)
v∗HB ,t = γB,t
[
BHB
BQB
+
HBHB
HBRB
]
and V ∗HB ,t =
1
HBRB
(45)
v∗HE ,t = γE,t
[
EHE
EBBQB
+
HEHE
HERE
]
and V ∗HE ,t =
1
HERE
. (46)
Proof. See Appendix A3.
14
Equations (35)-(39) are related to the quantities QF,t, QB,t, It, RB,t and RE,t, respec-
tively. They have to be compared one by one to equations (12)-(16) of Proposition 1 which
characterize the optimum. In particular, by analyzing condition (35) and the optimal cor-
responding one (12), we will be able to compute the tax that implements the first best
optimum (see next section). Equation (40) gives the interest rate and equations (41)-(46),
the equilibrium prices of Lt, Ft, Et, HB,t and HE,t, respectively. A particular equilibrium
is associated to a given triplet of policies {γB,t, γE,t, τt}∞t=0 and the set of equations given by
Proposition 2 allows to compute quantities and prices for this equilibrium. If the triplet of
policy tools is optimal, this set of equations gives the same quantities as the ones obtained
from Proposition 1; it also gives the first best prices.
Finally, in order to solve numerically the market outcome, we need to transform the
decentralized problem described above into a single maximization program. Proposition 3
explains how to proceed.
Proposition 3 Solving the following program:
max
{Ct,QF,t,QB,t,RE,t,RB,t,t≥0}
∫ ∞
0
U(Ct)e−
∫ t
0 ρsdsdt subject to:
K˙t = D(Tt)Q(.)− Ct − δKt −RE,t −RB,t −QF,t −QB,t − τtF (QF,t, Zt)
H˙i,t = γi,tH i(Ri,t, Hi,t), ∀i = {B,E}
Zt =
∫ t
0
F (QF,s, Zs)ds.
leads to the same characterizing conditions (35)-(39) as the decentralized equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A4.
5 Implementation of the optimum and determination of the
optimal policies
Recall that for a given set of public policies, a particular equilibrium is characterized by
conditions (35)-(39) of Proposition 2. This equilibrium will be said to be optimal if it satis-
fies the optimum characterizing conditions (12)-(16) of Proposition 1. By analogy between
these two sets of conditions, we can show that there exists a single triplet {γB,t, γE,t, τt}∞t=0
that implements the optimum.
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Since conditions (13) and (14) have the same expressions as (36) and (37) respectively,
we only have to compare the three remaining conditions of each proposition. First, by
identifying (12) to (35) and using (34), the level of the additive environmental tax that
implements the optimum  referred to as the optimal tax from now on  is defined by:
τ ot = −
α
U ′(Ct)
{∫ ∞
t
Φ′(Gt)e−ζ(s−t)
[∫ ∞
s
D′(Tt)QxU ′(Cx)e−m(x−t)−
∫ x
t ρydydx
]
ds
}
. (47)
The interpretation of (47) is quite standard. This expression reads as the ratio between
the marginal social cost of climate change  the marginal damage in terms of utility com-
ing from the consumption of an additional unit of final good  and the marginal utility
obtained by consuming this unit, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between pollution
and consumption. Equivalently, that corresponds to the social cost of one unit of carbon
in terms of final good.
Next, the correspondence between the equilibrium characterizing condition (38) (resp.
(39)) and the optimum characterizing condition (15) (resp. (16)) is achieved if and only if
γB,t (resp. γE,t) is equal to one, i.e. if both sectors are fully subsidized. These results are
summarized in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium defined in Proposition 2 is optimal if and only if the triplet
of policies {γB,t, γE,t, τt}∞t=0 is such that γB,t = γE,t = 1 and τt = τ ot , for all t ≥ 0.
Using the specified model as introduced in Appendix A1, the optimal carbon tax can
be illustrated by Figure 2.
[Figure 2]
This tax τ ot starts from some low 5 US$ per ton of carbon and follows an inverted U-
shape trajectory, reaching around 90 US$ by 2100, 200$ in 250 years, before plummeting.
As we will see later, this carbon policy increases the delivered price of the resource, i.e.
the market price including the carbon tax (pmt ). We will see also that this more expensive
fossil energy provides strong incentives for developing alternative energy supply. The next
section focuses on the analysis of those incentives.
6 Impacts of economic policies
In this empirical section, we use the analytical model developed so far to conduct numer-
ical simulations. We appraise the impacts of environmental and research policies on all
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variables  prices and quantities  in the decentralized equilibrium and we emphasize their
transmission channels. We proceed as follows. In sub-section 6.1, we compare the so-called
"laisser-faire" case, that consists in determining the outcome in the decentralized economy
without neither climate nor public policy, as well as the optimal outcome of the model.
In other words, starting from the equilibrium without any public policy, we analyze the
effect of the simultaneous introduction of optimal environmental and research policies. In
sub-section 6.2, we analyze the impacts of carbon tax variations on equilibrium trajecto-
ries, given an optimal research policy (γE = γB = 1). In sub-section 6.3, given an optimal
carbon tax scheme, we analyze how the trajectories evolve when i) γE and γB are simulta-
neously modified; ii) either γE or γB is modified while the other one is set to 0.3, i.e. when
the research policy focuses on a single sector, the remaining one being not subsidized at
all13.
We adopt the following notations that will help us pointing at various facts when
describing graphs. ∆τ,γ |X stands for the change in variable X due to a simultaneous
increase of τ from 0 to τ o and of γB = γE from 0.3 to 1 (cf. sub-section 6.1). ∆τ |X is the
change of X due to an increase in τ from 0 to τ o, given γB = γE = 1 (cf. sub-section 6.2).
Finally, given τ = τ o, ∆γB ,γE |X denotes the change in variable X due to a simultaneous
increase of γB and γE from 0.3 to 1, and ∆γi |X the change in variable X due to an increase
of γi from 0.3 to 1, with γj = 0.3, for i, j = {B,E} and i 6= j (cf. sub-section 6.3). The
table 1 summarizes the findings from our sensitivity analysis conducted consequently, i.e.
the signs of the ∆s.
6.1 Optimum vs laisser-faire
In both R&D sectors, the implementation of optimal policies clearly translates into much
faster knowledge accumulation (i.e. ∆τ,γ |HB > 0 and ∆τ,γ |HE > 0), as seen from Figure
3(a)14. Notice that R&D dedicated to energy efficiency is hardly carried out in the "laisser-
faire" equilibrium. The innovation selling prices VHE ,t and VHB ,t follow diverging time-
paths: VHE ,t decreases over time, while VHB ,t follows a reverse upward trend, at least for
the first two centuries (see Figure 3(b)). The optimal instruments shift the price of an
innovation dedicated to energy efficiency below its laisser-faire counterpart: ∆τ,γ |VHE <
13According to Jones (1995), we adopt the following convention: a situation without any public subsidy
is equivalent to setting the value of γi to 0.3, for i = {B,E}.
14Optimal and "laisser-faire" trajectories are referred to as "opti" and "l-f" in the graphs, respectively.
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Optimum vs Environmental R&D policies
Laisser-faire policy
X ∆τ,γ |X ∆τ |X ∆γB ,γE |X ∆γE |X ∆γB |X
HE + ∼ + + ∼
HB + ∼ + ∼ +
F − − − − −
B + + + − +
E + − + + +
D − − − − −
T − − − − −
VHE − ∼ − − ∼
VHB + ∼ + − +
pmF + + − − −
psF − − − − −
pB − ∼ − ∼ −
pE − + − − −
Table 1: Summary of economic policy effects
0. Simultaneously, they shift the selling price of innovations dedicated to the backstop
production above the laisser-faire level: ∆τ,γ |VHB < 0. As will be seen in sub-section 6.3,
those results are essentially caused by the R&D policies.
[Figure 3]
In the fossil fuel sector, the introduction of optimal policies implies a reduction of
the instantaneous flow of extraction: ∆τ,γ |F < 0 (see Figure 4(a)). Since this result is
observed at each date, the cumulative extraction is also reduced. The resource market
price increases, whereas its selling price diminishes: ∆τ,γ |pmF > 0 and ∆τ,γ |psF < 0. This
overall effect on fuel prices is essentially due to the environmental policy and will be
commented in sub-section 6.2.
[Figure 4]
In the backstop and energy sectors, the price of carbon-free energy pB,t, as well as of
final energy pE,t, is reduced: ∆τ,γ |pB < 0 and ∆τ,γ |pE < 0; their respective consumption
Bt and Et are intensified, overriding the fossil use reduction: ∆τ,γ |B > 0 and ∆τ,γ |E > 0
(see Figures 4(b) and 5(a)).
Finally, the optimal time-paths of temperature variation and environmental damage
start diverging from the laisser-faire case by the middle of the century: ∆τ,γ |T < 0 and
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∆τ,γ |D < 0 (see Figure 5(b)). In 2100, the optimal temperature variation is 9.4% lower
than the no-climate-policy case, reaching almost 5 degrees in the very long run. The
resulting loss in gross world product reveals only marginally affected by the end of this
century, the most prominent impacts occurring only later on15.
[Figure 5]
6.2 Sensitivity to environmental tax
In order to quantify how sensitive are the economic variables to the environmental policy,
we analyze the impacts of carbon tax variations on equilibrium trajectories, given an
optimal research policy (γE = γB = 1). The carbon tax τt is assumed to develop over time
according to the following patterns: the carbon tax is first assumed to be nil throughout
the entire time horizon (τt = 0 for all t); second, it is assumed to correspond to half of
the optimal carbon tax (τt = 0.5 × τ ot for all t); third, these outcomes are compared to
the optimal carbon tax implementation (τt = τ ot for all t). We summarize our findings as
follows.
In the R&D sectors, the choice of the environmental tax affects neither the innovation
prices nor the knowledge levels: ∆τ |Hi ≈ 0 and ∆τ |VHi ≈ 0, for i = {B,E}16.
As far as the resource market is concerned, reinforcing the carbon tax level throughout
the entire time horizon is shifting the fossil fuel market price upward, and then the resource
use downward, as depicted in Figure 6: ∆τ |pmF > 0 and ∆τ |F < 0. However, it is worth
observing that the selling price of the fossil resource is decreasing: ∆τ |psF > 0. This
reduction implies a rent transfer from the resource-holder to the government. The idea that
environmental taxes generally imply some redistributive effects in addition to the expected
efficiency gains has already been evoked by economists (see for example Nordhaus and
Boyer, 2000 and Grimaud and Rougé, 2005)17. Our framework provides an unambiguous
characterization of those redistributive effects and allows for the assessment of their extent.
15The quantitative results from our simulations should not be taken as granted. They would rather
exhibit some qualitative robustness of the model functional specifications. In particular, some further
developments of the model will require, among others, embedding an updated damage function from the
DICE model. Contrary to the current specification, the most recent calibration in Nordhaus (2007) shows
some positive non-market damages from the earliest phases of climate changes. Those revised cost estimates
would likely reinforce the attractiveness of a sounder climate policy.
16Note that we have conducted this sensitivity analysis to τt in the case of fully subsidized research
sectors, i.e. γE = γB = 1. However, according to some alternative runs not documented here, this
conclusion still applies when the research sectors are only partially financed (γE = γB = 0.3). One could
extrapolate this conclusion and conjecture that those results hold for any type of research policy.
17Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) justify the existence of a potential rent transfer by the fact that fossil
fuel availability is generally limited (i.e. resources are scarce) and their supply curves are relatively price-
inelastic. As they mention p.54, "In the limited case of perfectly price-inelastic supply of carbon-energy
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[Figure 6]
Concerning the backstop sector, the backstop price reveals unaffected by the environ-
mental policies, i.e. ∆τ |pB ≈ 0, since its production cost  that partly depends on the
specific level of knowledge in the backstop R&D sector HB  remains fairly constant.
However, the demand for the non-carbon backstop energy is stimulated by such policies
(see Figure 8(a)): ∆τ |B > 0. Indeed, in the energy sector, since firms face a higher fossil
fuel price, they substitute the backstop for the polluting resource. Nonetheless, this more
intensive backstop use is not sufficient to maintain the laisser-faire level of energy consump-
tion (see Figure 7(a)): ∆τ |E < 0. This last result comes from the increase of the energy
market price when a carbon tax is levied on the fossil fuel use (Figure 7(b)): ∆τ |pE > 0.
The implementation of the optimal carbon tax causes the energy market price to grow by
15% whereas, when the carbon tax is halved, the energy price increase is limited to 6% in
2100.
[Figures 7 and 8]
Finally, the reduced carbon intensity of the global economy stemming from the carbon
tax policy, slows down the increase in the temperature variation, and in turn, reduces the
environmental damage to some 0.3% of GWP in 2100 as compared with the laisser-faire
case, as shown in Figure 8(b). In the longer run, the discrepancies are growing such that
the optimal carbon tax implementation saves 1.5% of GWP loss by the end of our time
horizon.
6.3 Sensitivity to research subsidies
When implementing a research policy, the regulator can act either on the sole energy R&D
sector, on the sole backstop R&D sector, or on both sectors simultaneously. Then, a
complete analysis of the effect of such a policy requires the dissociation of the joint effects
from the marginal ones on each sector. For this matter, we allow for γE and γB to take the
following values: 0.3, 0.6 and 1 and we proceed to two kinds of comparisons. For a given
optimal carbon tax scheme, i.e. τt = τ ot for all t, we analyze how the trajectories evolve
when i) γE and γB are simultaneously modified; ii) either γE or γB is modified while the
with zero extraction costs, carbon taxes may have no economic effect at all and would simply redistribute
rents from the resource owners to the government". The situation described in our model is not so extreme
since the resource will never be exhausted given the specified extraction technology. Nevertheless, beyond
the efficiency effects, we still observe a rent effect.
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other one is set to 0, i.e. when the research policy focuses on a single sector, the remaining
one being not subsidized at all.
Let us begin with the R&D sectors. We have previously noted (cf. sub-section 6.2)
that the environmental policy has no effect on the level of knowledge and on the innovation
selling prices. Thus, the overall effect of optimal policies on R&D sectors, as mentioned
in sub-section 6.1, is only due to the research policies. A simultaneous increase in γB and
γE makes the knowledge accumulation in both R&D sectors faster: ∆γB ,γE |Hi > 0, for
i = {B,E}. However, as shown in Figures 9(a) and 10(a), if we decompose the aggregate
effect according to each sector, we observe that there is no cross-sector effects: ∆γB ,γE |Hi ≈
∆γi |Hi and ∆γj |Hi ≈ 0, for i, j = {B,E} and i 6= j.
The innovation selling prices being equal to the marginal costs of innovations, appre-
hending how they are affected by the optimal policy proves difficult. Contrary to the
stock of knowledge in each R&D sector, the innovation selling prices do not react the same
way to any research policy, as depicted in Figures 9(b) and 10(b): ∆γB ,γE |VHE < 0 and
∆γB ,γE |VHB > 0. From (45) and (46), we have:
VHi,t =
1
H iRi
=
Ri,t
biH i(Ri,t, Hi,t)
, for i = {B,E} .
For any i = {B,E}, both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio increase.
Nevertheless, when i = E, RE,t grows less than bEHE(.), which leads to a decrease of the
marginal cost of innovation in the energy R&D sector, along with its selling price VHE ,t.
Alternatively, when i = B, RB,t grows more than bBHB(.), which leads to the opposite
result. Those complex interactions stem from our general equilibrium framework.
Some further analysis of the R&D policy make the effect of each type of R&D subsidy
on the innovation selling prices clearer. First, ∆γE |VHE ≈ ∆γB ,γE |VHE and ∆γB |VHE ≈ 0:
there is no cross-sector effects on the energy R&D sector, i.e. γB has no effect on VHE ,t
(see Figure 9(b)). Second, ∆γB |VHB > ∆γB ,γE |VHB > 0 and ∆γE |VHB < 0 (see Figure
10(b)). In this case, strong cross-sector effects are occurring. When the only backstop
R&D sector is subsidized, the increase in the innovation selling price in backstop R&D
is higher than the increase which is observed when both R&D sectors are subsidized.
Moreover, subsidizing the only energy R&D causes the backstop innovation price to move
in the opposite direction, i.e. to decrease.
[Figures 9 and 10]
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In turn, we examine the simultaneous effects of research policies on the fossil fuel, the
backstop and the energy sectors, and we try to give some intuitions on the results. Since a
simultaneous increase in γB and γE stimulates the knowledge accumulation in both sectors
(i.e. HB and HE increase), this directly reduces the production costs of the backstop and
the energy services, as well as their respective market prices pB and pE : ∆γB ,γE |pB < 0
and ∆γB ,γE |pE < 0 (Figures 11(b) and 12(b)). This implies an increase in the backstop
and energy productions: ∆γB ,γE |B > 0 and ∆γB ,γE |E > 0 (Figures 11(a) and 12(a)). Since
the backstop is relatively less costly than the fossil fuel (pB/pF decreases), then the energy
producers substitute the former for the latter: ∆γB ,γE |F < 0 (Figure 13(a)). The demand
for the fossil fuel being reduced, its price decreases: ∆γB ,γE |pF < 0. Remark that an
increase in γE reduces the backstop production, but leaves its market price unchanged:
∆γE |B < 0 (which implies ∆γB |B > ∆γB ,γE |B > 0) and ∆γE |pB ≈ 0.
[Figures 11, 12 and 13]
Finally, the damage and the temperature changes are positively affected by a rise in
energy subsidies to one or both sectors (see Figure 13(b)).
7 Conclusion
This paper establishes the template of a climate change integrated assessment model, ca-
pable of defining the decentralized outcome, i.e. the equilibrium, of a given climate policy
architecture. One of the main features of the model lies in the analytical derivation of the
innovation prices. In our context, those innovations are dedicated to knowledge accumu-
lation in two sectors: the backstop energy sector and the energy efficiency sector. Since
knowledge is not embodied into intermediate goods, its price is defined in an alternative
way (as a part of its social value that is equal to the sum of its marginal profitabilities in
all sectors using it).
Another key feature of the model lies in its ability and suitability to assess various
economic policies. As the economy encompasses three market distortions, i.e. the pollution
from fossil resource consumption and the two research spillovers, two types of economic
policy instruments are implemented: a tax on the fossil fuel use and a research subsidy
for each R&D sector. As one obtains a distinct equilibrium for each vector of instruments,
we are able to test for any policy architectures, including suboptimal carbon taxes and
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research subsidies, contrary to Popp (2006c). This should be of particular interest for
studying second best policy in the context of climate change mitigation.
We use a calibrated version of the model to simulate the socially optimum outcome
and compare it to its laisser-faire counterpart in the decentralized economy. We assess the
impacts on all economic and environmental variables and characterize the efficiency of the
policy measures, and particularly the efficiency of the R&D funding that have to be devoted
to energy technologies. The laisser-faire situation results in some additional gross world
product losses of 1.6% in the long run, as compared to the socially desirable outcome. We
exhibit the significant influence of R&D activities aiming at reducing the polluting fossil
energy use. This setting advocates for higher subsidies dedicated to renewable energies,
and, to a lower extent, for subsidies aiming at improving energy efficiency. This mainly
comes from the underlying assumption on the potential improvements of energy efficiency
that are limited to 20%, suggesting that improvement in energy efficiency would rather
be a short term option for tackling the climate change issue, while bringing the backstop
energy to the market is more beneficial in the longer term.
The natural extension of the model will consist in introducing a richer set of climate
mitigation options such as the possibility of capturing and storing the carbon in geological
formations. One might also introduce biofuel energy, the feedstock then encompassing
the features of a renewable resource. The specificities of nuclear energy may also be
incorporated in our model. The flexibility of the tool at hand allows for the modeling
of specific knowledge stocks for each of the energy supply technologies.
Finally, the calibration of this model may require some further adjustment. In this re-
spect, alternative functional forms may be experienced (See Nordhaus's comment on Stern
review and the accompanying data update  Nordhaus, 2007). Moreover, as suggested by
the IPCC report (IPCC, 2000), a number of plausible scenarios may arise in the future. The
DICE model calibration may be revised so as to match more closely the GDP projections
of other long term studies. In particular, it would be worthwhile analyzing the effects of
a more sustained long term growth. An enhanced world economic growth would turn into
more intensive fossil energy use, at least in the early decades where the renewable energy
does not exhibit sufficient cost reduction. Besides the increased externality resulting from
more rapid climate change, the modified economically recoverable resource base may, in
turn, confront us to lower fossil resource availabilities in the long run. The effect on the
fossil fuel prices and the incentive for increased investment in clean energy R&D deserves
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some further investigation.
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Appendix
A1. Analytical specification and calibration of the model
To characterize analytically our model, we use a mix of functional forms considered in the
DICE and ENTICE-BR models:
Q(K,E,L,A) = AKγEβL1−γ−β, with β, γ ∈ (0, 1)
gi =
(
gi0
di
)(
1− e−dit
)
, with di > 0, ∀i = {A,L}
E(HE , F,B) =
[
(αHHE)ρH + (F ρB +BρB )
ρH
ρB
] 1
ρH , with αH , ρH , ρB ∈ (0, 1)
H i(Ri, Hi) = aiRbii H
φi
i , with ai > 0, and bi, φi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i = {E,B}
D(T ) =
1
1 + a1T + a2T 2
, with a1 < 0 and a2 > 0
U(C) = k1L log
(
C
L
)
+ k2, with k1, k2 > 0
Φ(G) = 1
log(G/2)
log 2
+O(t),
where O(t) = 3t− 4 for t < t¯, O(t) = 5 otherwise, i > 0, i = 1, 5. We also consider the
following production functions:
F (QF , Z) =
QF
cF + αF × (Z/Z¯)ηF , with cF , αF , ηF > 0
B(QB, HB) = QB × H
ηB
B
αB
, with αB, ηB > 0.
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For numerical computations, we use the same values of exogenous parameters as in the
ENTICE-BR model 18. Since we have transformed the cost functions of fossil fuel and
backstop into production functions, we also specify the parameters of these production
functions in such a way that the calibration of the ENTICE-BR model still applies to our
model. Finally, we consider a finite time horizon starting at date t0 = 1990 and ending at
T = t0 + 350.
A2. Proof of Proposition 1
Let H be the discounted value of the Hamiltonian of the optimal program (we drop time
subscripts for notational convenience):
H = U(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds + λD(T )Q {K,E [HE , F (QF , Z), B(QB, HB)]}
−λ
(
C +QF +QB +
∑
i
Ri + δK
)
+
∑
i
νiH
i(Ri, Hi)
+µG(αF − ζG) + µT [Φ(G)−mT ] + ηF.
The associated first order conditions are:
∂H
∂C
= U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds − λ = 0 (48)
∂H
∂QF
= λ[D(T )QEEFFQF − 1] + αµGFQF + ηFQF = 0 (49)
∂H
∂QB
= λ[D(T )QEEBBQB − 1] = 0 (50)
∂H
∂Ri
= −λ+ νiH iRi = 0, i = {B,E} (51)
∂H
∂K
= λ[D(T )QK − δ] = −λ˙ (52)
∂H
∂Hi
= λD(T )QEEHi + νiH
i
Hi = −ν˙i, i = {B,E} (53)
∂H
∂G
= −ζµG + µTΦ′(G) = −µ˙G (54)
∂H
∂T
= λD′(T )Q−mµT = −µ˙T (55)
∂H
∂Z
= λD(T )QEEFFZ + αµGFZ + ηFZ = −η˙ (56)
18For the sake of simplicity, the exogenous land use emissions have been omitted. Those emissions are
likely small (see Nordhaus, 2007) and would alter neither our qualitative nor our quantitative results.
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and the transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞λK = 0 (57)
lim
t→∞ νiHi = 0, i = {B,E} (58)
lim
t→∞µGG = 0 (59)
lim
t→∞µTT = 0 (60)
lim
t→∞ ηZ = 0 (61)
First, we show how to obtain condition (12), the less evident one. From (49), we have:
αµG + η = −λ [D(T )QEEFFQF − 1]
FQF
,
where λ = U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds from (48). Substituting this expression into (56) and after sim-
plifications, we get the following differential equation:
η˙ = − FZ
FQF
U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds.
Integrating this expression and using transversality condition (61), we obtain:
η =
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
U ′(C)e−
∫ s
0 ρduds. (62)
From (48) and (55), we have:
µ˙T = mµT −D′(T )QU ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds.
Solution of such a differential equation is given by:
µT = emt
[
µT,0 −
∫ t
0
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−(ms+
∫ s
0 ρdx)ds
]
.
Using (60), this expression becomes:
µT = emt
∫ ∞
t
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−(ms+
∫ s
0 ρdx)ds =
∫ ∞
t
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−[m(s−t)+
∫ s
0 ρdx]ds.
(63)
Now, let us consider condition (54). Using transversality condition (59), this differential
solution is solved for:
µG = eζt
∫ ∞
t
µTΦ′(G)e−ζsds =
∫ ∞
t
µTΦ′(G)e−ζ(s−t)ds, (64)
where µT is defined by (63). Finally, condition (12) is equivalent to condition (49) when
replacing λ, µG and η by their expressions coming from (48), (64) and (62) respectively,
and dividing each side of the equation by FQF .
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Second, the characterizing condition (13) is directly provided by (50). To continue,
remark that (48) implies:
λ˙
λ
=
U˙ ′(C)
U ′(C)
− ρ. (65)
Then, condition (14) is simply obtained from (52) and (65).
Finally, differentiating (51) with respect to time and using (13), (53) and (65), we get
the characterizing conditions (15) and (16), which concludes the proof.
A3. Proof of proposition 2
The first characterizing condition (35) is obtained by replacing η into (17) by its expression
coming from (20) and by noting that psF = pEEF − τ from (22), where pE = D(T )QE
from (32). Second, combining (21), (23) and (32) leads to condition (36). Next, using (31)
and (34), we directly get condition (37). Finally, the differentiation of (27) with respect to
time leads to:
V˙Hi
VHi
= −H˙
i
Ri
H iRi
, i = {B,E} .
Substituting this expression into (26) and using (24), (27) and (28), it comes:
r = −H˙
i
Ri
H iRi
+ γiH iRi
(
viHi +
H iHi
H iRi
)
, ∀i = {B,E} .
We thus obtain the two last characterizing equilibrium conditions (38) and (39) by replac-
ing into this last equation vBHB and v
E
HE
by their expressions coming from (30) and (29)
respectively.
A4. Proof of Proposition 3
The Hamiltonian in discounted value of the program writes:
H = U(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρsds + λ
[
D(T )Q(.)− C −
∑
i
Ri −QF −QB − δK − τF (QF , Z)
]
+
∑
i
νiγiH
i(Ri, Hi) + ηF (QF , Z)
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The associated first order conditions are:
∂H
∂C
= U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds − λ = 0⇒ λ˙
λ
=
U˙ ′(C)
U ′(C)
− ρ (66)
∂H
∂QF
= λ[D(T )QEEFFQF − 1− τFQF ] + ηFQF = 0 (67)
∂H
∂QB
= λ[D(T )QEEBBQB − 1] = 0 (68)
∂H
∂Ri
= −λ+ νiγiH iRi = 0, i = {B,E} (69)
∂H
∂K
= λ[D(T )QK − δ] = −λ˙ (70)
∂H
∂Hi
= λD(T )QEEHi + νiγiH
i
Hi = −ν˙i, i = {B,E} (71)
∂H
∂Z
= λ[D(T )QEEFFZ − τFZ ] + ηFZ = −η˙ (72)
and the transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞λK = 0 (73)
lim
t→∞ νiHi = 0, i = {B,E} (74)
lim
t→∞ ηZ = 0 (75)
As in Appendix A.2, we use (67), (72) and (75) to determine η. It is the same expression
than (62). Next, replacing into (67) λ and η by their expressions (66) and (62) respectively,
we have the first characterizing condition (35). Condition (36) is a direct consequence of
(68). Condition (37) is obtained from (66) and (70). Finally, differentiating (69) with
respect to time and using (66) and (71) imply the characterizing conditions (38) and (39).
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Stocks of specific knowledge of energy and backstop R&D sectors: HE, HB
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Figure 3: Effect of optimal instruments on HE and HB (a)  VHE and VHB (b)
(a) CO2-equivalent fossil fuel consumption and fuel prices: F, pF
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(b) CO2-equivalent non-carbon backstop use and backstop price: B, pB
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(a) CO2-equivalent effective energy units and energy market price: E, pE
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(b) Temperature change from the 1900 level and environmental damage
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Figure 5: Effect of optimal instruments on E and pE (a)  T and D(T ) (b)
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(a) CO2-equivalent fossil fuel consumption: F
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(a) CO2-equivalent effective energy units: E
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(a) Co2-equivalent non-carbon backstop use: B
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Figure 8: Effect of of the environmental tax on B (a) and D(T ) (b)
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(a) Specific knowledge of energy R&D sector: HE
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Figure 9: Effect of the research policy on HE (a) and VHE (b)
(a) Specific knowledge in backstop R&D sector: HB
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Figure 10: Effect of the research policy on HB (a) and VHB (b)
(a) CO2-equivalent non-carbon backstop use: B
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(b) Backstop market price: pB
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Figure 11: Effect of the research policy on B (a) and pB (b)
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(a) CO2-equivalent effective energy units: E
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(b) Energy market price: pE
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Figure 12: Effect of the research policy on E (a) and pE (b)
(a) CO2-equivalent fossil fuel consumption: F
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(b) Environmental damage in % of the GWP
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Figure 13: Effect of the research policy on F (a) and D(T ) (b)
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